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VerbAgreementandEpistemicMarking: aTypological
Journey from the Himalayas to the Caucasus
Balthasar Bickel (Leipzig)
Epistemische Morphologie registriert manchmal das Wissen ¨ uber speziﬁsche Ar-
gumente anstatt ¨ uber Propositionen. Sie steht dann in minimalem Kontrast
zu Kongruenzmorphologie, die die Identit¨ at von Argumenten registriert. Diese
¨ Ahnlichkeit l¨ asst erwarten, dass die relevante Personenkategorie – der Referent,
dessen Wissen in epistemischer Morphologie angezeigt wird bzw. der Referent
dessen Merkmale in Kongruenzmorphologie uniﬁziert werden – der gleichen ty-
pologischen Varianz unterliegen. Eine Untersuchung vorwiegend himalajischer
und kaukasischer Daten best¨ atigt diese Voraussage: in beiden Systemen sind Per-
sonenkategorien bald als Sprecher vs. Andere, bald als Adressat vs. Andere, bald
als Informant vs. Andere (Sprecher in Aussagen, Adressat in Fragen) deﬁniert.
Die einzige Option, die in epistemischen Systemen bisher nicht belegt ist, ist die
Dreifachopposition von Sprecher vs. Adressat vs. Andere, die in Kongruenzsys-
temen g¨ angig ist.
1 Introduction
Studies of the epistemic categories expressed in Tibetan auxiliaries and
copulas have mostly compared the phenomena with mirativity marking,
and this is no doubt the correct comparandum in diachronic research.
However, synchronic descriptions are also often tempted to compare the
relevant categories with agreement systems or similar reference-related
structures, at least for expository purposes when explaining how the sys-
tem works (e.g. Denwood 1999, Tournadre 1996, Goldstein et al. 1991).
The purview of this chapter is a typological comparison of Tibetan
epistemic categories with known agreement systems in order to determine
in what respects the two systems are the same and in what respects they
are di erent. The rationale for such an enterprise is two-fold: ﬁrst, it is part
of a large-scale research program which aims at replacing debates about
appropriate terminology (‘is it correct to call X an agreement system?’)
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by ﬁne-grained typologies (‘in what respect is the auxiliary system of Li
the same as the agreement system of Lj?’; Bickel 2007); second, as we will
see, a comparison with Tibetan epistemic auxiliary systems allows insights
into the nature and limits of agreement systems that are otherwise simply
unavailable.
I begin by identifying the crucial variables of Tibetan epistemic mor-
phology through a comparison with mirativity systems. I then raise the
question of how far the same variables also apply to verb agreement sys-
tems, especially to non-canonical instances of such systems. This will lead
us from epistemic marking and agreement systems in the Himalayas to
rare kinds of agreement systems in the Caucasus and elsewhere–covering
thereby two of Roland Bielmeier’s ﬁeld areas. The ﬁnal section summarizes
the ﬁndings and proposes a generalized system of variables for analyzing
epistemic and agreement systems alike.
2 Mirativity, person and arguments
The opposition expressed by mirativity systems is the di erence between
information that is ‘assimilated’, ‘old’, ‘deﬁnite’ (Bielmeier 2000) knowl-
edge (henceforth glossed as ‘def’) and information that is ‘as yet unassim-
ilated’ or ‘freshly acquired’ knowledge (‘mirative’, ‘mir’). Such distinctions
are fairly widespread in the languages of the world (for surveys, see De-
Lancey 1997, Lazard 1999, Aikhenvald & Dixon 2003, Aikhenvald 2004,
among others), but, naturally, the basic distinction is elaborated in dif-
ferent ways in di erent languages–even in closely related languages and
dialects, as Bielmeier (2000) has demonstrated for Tibetan. All I am con-
cerned with here is the availability in a language of a grammatical category
that di erentiates between kinds of knowledge.
What di erentiates Tibetan epistemic morphology from standard aver-
age miratives can best be captured by di erent responses to two key vari-
ables: (i) whose knowledge is at issue? (ii) what is the knowledge about? I
refer to the ﬁrst variable as the person variable, and to the second variable
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2.1 Person
In most mirative systems, such as the one found in Turkish, the person
whose knowledge is at issue is always the speaker; in Tibetan, by con-
trast, it is the category ‘informant’, i.e. the speaker in statements and the
addressee in questions–sometimes called ‘conjunct’ (Hale 1980, DeLancey
1986), ‘epistemic source’ (Hargreaves 2005) or ‘locutor’ (Aikhenvald 2004).
As a result, the two languages use mirative forms in very similar ways in
statements but in very di erent ways in questions.
In statements, the use of mirative forms is similar in both languages.1
The e ect is to suggest that the proposition expressed is in some sense
new, not yet assimilated knowledge. As a result, propositions with ﬁrst
person referents have a special status, as a mirative form is compatible
only in situations of near-amnesia, sleep, or unconsciousness, where the
speaker is surprised at his or her own deeds, cf:2
(1) Tibetan (Tournadre 1996:197)
ṅa
1sabs
Lha.sa-r
L.-obl
phyin-pa-red.
go.pst-aor-mir
‘I must have been to Lhasa.’ (+> ‘I can’t remember; I was a child then.’)
(2) Turkish (Kissling 1960:154)
bu
dem
gece
night
çarşaf-ım-ı
bed.sheet-1sposs-acc
yırt-mış-ım.
tear-mir-1s
‘I must have torn my sheet tonight.’ (+> ‘I can’t remember.’)
In questions, Tibetan miratives strongly di er from Turkish miratives. In
Tibetan, the miratives are not tied to the conversational role ‘speaker’,
but to the role ‘informant’, the information source. Since in questions, the
informant is by deﬁnition the addressee, second person questions require
the deﬁnite form; the mirative is virtually excluded since it would suggest
1 There is one important diﬀerence which I gloss over here: in Turkish, definite
has zero exponence and is the functionally unmarked member of the opposition; in
Tibetan both values have overt exponence and in most contexts and in most varities,
the oppositions seems to be either equipollent or having the mirative as the functionally
unmarked member. This has no direct impact for the following discussion.
2 Abbreviations follow the Leipzig Glossing Rules (www.eva.mpg.de/lingua/
ﬁles/morpheme.html), with the addition of aor for ‘aorist’ and capital letters for gen-
ders in Nakh-Daghestanian languages. The symbol ‘+>’ introduces implicatures.4 Balthasar Bickel
that the speaker charges the addressee with lack of self-awareness while
at the same time asking a question about his or her intentions:
(3) Tibetan (Tournadre 1996:220)
khyed.raṅ
2abs
ʼgro-gi-yod-pas?
go.prs-ipfv-def-q
(*-dug-)
mir
‘Are you going?’
In Turkish, the mirative always refers to the speaker. Therefore, the form
is suitable for second person questions, where it signals that the speaker
is surprised at the information he or she is seeking to get conﬁrmed in the
question:
(4) Turkish (Gretler 1987:78)
sen
2snom
konuş-ur
speak-aor
mu-ymuş-sun,
q-mir-2s
Hasan?
H.
‘Hasan, can you speak nevertheless?’ (+> Speaker is surprised.)
A third possibility has recently been discovered in the Caucasus, in the
Nakh-Daghestanian language Chechen (Molochieva 2006). Deﬁnite knowl-
edge marking in this language is centered neither on the speaker nor on the
informant, but on the addressee. The relevant markers are phonologically
reduced variants of second person dative pronouns (singular and plural,
as well as ﬁrst person inclusive) that are restricted to post-verbal position
(unlike ordinary pronouns which can occur in all argument positions in
the clause). Using these markers entails that the speaker thinks that the
addressee must have deﬁnite, well-established knowledge of the situation:
(5) Chechen (Molochieva 2006)
a. Zara
Z(j).abs
j-eʔna
j-come.prf
ħan?
2sdef
‘Zara has been here, hasn’t she?’ (+> ‘You must have noticed!’)
b. As
1serg
ħuːna
2sdat
koch
dress.abs
ecna
buy.prf
ħan.
2sdef
‘I bought you a dress.’ (+> ‘You must have known that I would!’)Verb Agreement and Epistemic Marking 5
Example (5b) shows the formal di erence between a regular second person
dative pronoun in beneﬁciary function (ħuːna ‘for you’) and the post-verbal
deﬁnite marker ħan.3
2.2 Scope
The Turkish, Tibetan and Chechen data in the preceding share the prop-
erty that what is at stake is the knowledge of the entire proposition. How-
ever, unlike Turkish and Chechen, and most other languages with mirative
systems, some varieties of Tibetan–notably what Tournadre (1996) calls
Standard Spoken Tibetan–narrow the scope down to one of the referents
contained in the proposition. As a result, a deﬁnite marker like yod can
only occur if the informant is personally involved in the situation, either
as an argument (6a), a possessor (6b), or as an otherwise interested person
(6c):
(6) Tibetan
a. ṅa-s
1sg.erg
dpe.cha
Tibetan.book.abs
yag.po
well
lta-gi-yod. (Tournadre 1996:275)
read-ipfv-def
‘As for me, I am reading the sacred texts.’
b. khoṅ
3sg.abs
ṅa-ʼi
1sg-gen
rtsa-la
near-dat
phebs-kyi-yod. (Tournadre 1996:223)
come-ipfv-def
‘He comes to my place.’
c. ja
tea
ʼdi
dem
zhim.po
excellent
yod. (Tournadre 1996:222)
def
‘This tea is excellent.’ (+> ‘I have tasted it.’)
This scope restriction is strongest in the aorist system, where the deﬁnite
knowledge marker yin can only have scope over volitional agents (glossed
below as ‘def(a)’.) As a result, yin is incompatible with verbs like mthoṅ
‘see’ that do not license such an argument (Tournadre 1996:192):
(7) Tibetan
a. ṅa-s
1s-erg
dkar.yol
cup.abs
bcag-pa-yin.
break-aor-def(a)
‘I broke the cup.’
3 While deﬁnite-knowledge marking seems to be common throughout Chechen and
Ingush, the forms and the degree of phonological reduction vary considerably across
dialects (Johanna Nichols, p.c.).6 Balthasar Bickel
b. * ṅa-s
1s-erg
mthoṅ-pa-yin.
see-aor-def(a)
b’. ṅa-s
1s-erg
mthoṅ-byuṅ.
see-aor.def(g)
‘I saw it.’
As shown by (7b’), if there is no a argument available, deﬁnite knowledge
marking in the aorist requires the use of a dedicated marker byu˙ n, which
takes scope over recipients, goals and experiencers (‘def(g)’). The tight-
est scope restrictions of a mirative system that I am aware of are those
in Kathmandu Newar, where deﬁnite knowledge marking only ever takes
scope over volitional agents, never over other arguments, let alone entire
propositions (Hargreaves 2003, 2005). In the following I refer to such sys-
tems as epistemic argument marking (as opposed to epistemic proposition
marking).
Epistemic argument marking has an important implication for the se-
mantics of the epistemic relationship. When the scope of epistemic mark-
ing is on a proposition, the precise nature of the knowledge relationship
between the informant and the proposition is ﬂexible: there are many ways
in which one can become familiar with a situation, through participation
or observation but also more indirectly by having some possessive relation
or some general interest or empathy. When the scope is on a speciﬁed, in-
dividual argument, by contrast, deﬁnite knowledge is possible only if the
informant is in fact identical with the argument. Note that what is at stake
is knowledge of a referent in a certain argument role. One can of course
have old, assimilated knowledge of someone as such, but this is not the
same as having such knowledge of the person in a speciﬁc argument role–
e.g. as a volitional agent, or as a recipient–in a speciﬁc situation. Here,
only the person herself or himself can possibly have the required knowl-
edge. This is the point where epistemic argument marking approaches the
nature of standard agreement systems, as I will explore next.
3 Epistemic argument marking vs. agreement
As observed above, marking a given person (say, the informant) as having
deﬁnite knowledge about a speciﬁed argument (say, the agent) entails
that the informant is identical with the speciﬁed argument. It is crucialVerb Agreement and Epistemic Marking 7
to note that this is a one-way material implication and not an equivalence
relationship: while using a deﬁnite knowledge form entails identity of a
given person and a given argument, it does not follow from this that not
using a deﬁnite knowledge form entails distinctness of that person and
that argument. A mirative form like phyin-pa-red ‘go-aor-mir’ does not
necessarily entail that another person (a third person, or the addressee)
was the agent. The form merely suggests that the speaker is not familiar
with the agentive force in the reported event. Therefore, it is perfectly
compatible with a ﬁrst person pronoun, as in example (1).
The reason for the one-way relationship between person and argument is
that, despite its similarity to agreement marking, the system is fundamen-
tally based on an epistemic opposition between knowing and not knowing
the argument. In order to distinguish between epistemic argument and
agreement marking we therefore need an additional typological variable
that speciﬁes the relationship between person and argument. In epistemic
argument marking this relationship is one of knowledge, in agreement sys-
tems this relationship is one of feature matching, or, as argued in Bickel
(2000), of feature subsumption (part-whole relations) or feature apposi-
tions.
Interestingly, however, the same distinctions between kinds of person
values that we noticed among epistemic systems are also found among
agreement systems, speciﬁcally, the distinction between speaker-based,
informant-based, and addressee-based systems. This is shown in Table
1 (p. 8), where the person and scope variables are cross-tabulated. Note
that the relationship variable is relevant only when the scope variable is
set to ‘speciﬁed argument’ or ‘interested referent’ (covering both posses-
sors, as in example 6b, and other interested parties such as ‘ethical dative’
referents). When the scope variable is set to ‘proposition’, the relationship
is necessarily an epistemic one. The variable settings scope = ‘proposition’
and person = ‘speaker’ characterize the Turkish mirative system; the set-
tings scope = ‘proposition’ and person = ‘addressee’ are instantiated by
Chechen. The setting scope = ‘proposition’ and person = ‘informant’ is
what we ﬁnd throughout Tibetan, with frequent but cross-dialectically
variable extensions to scope = ‘interested referent’ with relationship =
‘epistemic’. The settings scope = ‘speciﬁed argument’, relationship = ‘epis-
temic’ and person = ‘informant’ characterize the Kathmandu Newar sys-8 Balthasar Bickel
scope
proposition
interested
referent
speciﬁed
argument
p
e
r
s
o
n
speaker
vs. other Turkish
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
h
i
p
epistemic
agreement
informant
vs. other
Tibetan
epistemic Tibetan
Std. Spoken Tibetan;
Kathmandu Newar
agreement
addressee
vs. other
Chechen
epistemic
agreement
Table 1: The interplay between typological variables of person, scope (of person)
and person-argument relationship. Small caps indicate variable names, ital-
ics indicate variable values (settings).
tem, as well as those parts of the Tibetan epistemic morphology that are
restricted to speciﬁed arguments.
What about the empty cells that are predicted by how the variables
interact with each other? The combination of person = ‘informant’ with
scope = ‘argument’, like in Tibetan and Newar, but with an agreement
relationship is attested in some languages of the Caucasus, speciﬁcally in
Daghestanian languages. A case in point is the su xal agreement that has
developed in the Megeb dialect of Dargi (where it supplements the inher-
ited gender agreement that is available in the form of a preﬁx or inﬁx in
some verbs).4 The su xal agreement distinguishes between -ra for infor-
mants in subject (s or a) role as opposed to zero for non-informant sub-
jects. Since the critical role is deﬁned as ‘informant’ rather than ‘speaker’,
-ra refers to the speaker in statements, but to the addressee in questions.
Consider the following examples. (Note that -ra regularly assimilates to
the preceding consonant; preﬁx agreement shows the gender of the abso-
lutive argument, here b- registering gender ‘b’.)
4 The Megeb data were brought to my attention by a LinguistList posting by Wolf-
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(8) Megeb dialect of Dargi (Magometov 1982:69)
a. nu-ni
1s-erg
/ nušaʼi-ni
1p-erg
kung
book(b).abs
b-el-un-na
b-read-pst-informant
‘I/we read the book.’
b. ħu-ni
2s-erg
/ itiʼ-in
3s-erg
kung
book(b).abs
b-el-un.
b-read-pst
‘You/he read the book.’
c. ħu-ni
2s-erg
/ ħušaʼ-ini
2p-erg
kung
book(b).abs
b-el-un-na-w?
b-read-pst-informant-q
‘Did you read the book?’
d. nu-ni
1s-erg
/ itiʼ-ini
3s-erg
kung
book(b).abs
b-el-un-w?
b-read-pst-q
‘Did I/he read the book?’
The data in (8a–b) are statements and therefore -ra ‘informant’ signals
that the speaker is the subject. In the interrogative sentences (8c–d), by
contrast, the informant is the addressee and therefore -ra indicates that
the addressee is the subject. As a result, a question like ‘Did I read the
book?’, as in (8d), fails to trigger su xal agreement because the informant,
here the addressee, is not subject.
Megeb ﬁlls cells with person = ‘informant’ in agreement systems. Com-
binations of person = ‘speaker’ with agreement relationships are also at-
tested (Cysouw 2003, Siewierska 2004). An example is the isolate language
Chitimacha that was once spoken in South Louisiana:
(9) Chitimacha (Swadesh 1946)
a. get-ik
beat-1s
‘I beat’
b. get-nuk
beat-1p
‘we beat’
c. get-i
beat-non1s
‘you beat’ or ‘s/he beats’
d. get-na
beat-non1p
‘you beat’ or ‘they beat’10 Balthasar Bickel
There is no evidence that -ik and -nuk would register anything else than the
speaker in questions (as they would if the system was based on informant
rather the speaker).
A system where the setting person = ‘speaker’ combines with an epis-
temic instead of an agreement relationship is possibly found in Sangkong,
a Lolo-Burmese language of Yunnan, although the data are too scarce to
allow a deﬁnite conclusion. This language has a basic opposition between
ﬁrst and nonﬁrst person marking similar to what we noted for Chitimacha,
but, unlike in Chitimacha, the same opposition also has epistemic uses:
(10) Sangkong (Matiso  1993)
a. ŋa55
1s
/ ho33ɲaŋ31
1p
pɤ33
hit
tso33
middle
pi55
prf
ŋa55.
1
‘I / we hit the mark.’
b. thaŋ55
3s
/ thi55kun33
3p
pɤ33
hit
tso33
middle
pi55
prf
ʑe55.
non-1
‘S/he / they hit the mark.’
c. laŋ55ɕa55
paddyﬁeld
me33
loc
laŋ55tɕho31
water
qø33
have
ŋa55.
1
‘There’s water in the paddyﬁeld.’ (+> ‘I see it with my own eyes.’)
d. thaŋ55
3s
ti31
one
tha55
time
ʑi33
come
tse55
exp
pi55
prf
ŋa55.
1
‘S/he has already come.’ (+> ‘I know this personally.’)
Examples (10a–b) are not distinguishable from a regular agreement sys-
tem, where the verb agrees with the subject in person: ﬁrst person in (10a)
vs. non-ﬁrst person in (10b). But, as (10c–d) show, ŋa is synchronically
also used in ways similar to Tibetan sentences ending in yod, expressing
deﬁnite knowledge about the situation. What is unclear from the pub-
lished data on Sangkong is whether non-1 marking can also be used with
ﬁrst person sentences with the implicature that the speaker was not aware
of his or her own activities, much like in (1) and (2). If this is possible,
and the purely epistemic uses of ŋa in (10c–d) suggests it is possible, the
Sangkong system would instantiate a speaker-based epistemic system.
Addressee-based agreement systems are occasionally found as a result of
phonological mergers in paradigms, e.g. in Spanish where the second per-
son past tense form hablabas ‘you spoke’ is in opposition to a general form
hablaba ‘I spoke’ or ‘s/he/it spoke’ (see Cysouw 2003 for discussion of thisVerb Agreement and Epistemic Marking 11
and similar systems worldwide). Limited to the plural, Standard German
also illustrates the same pattern, although in this language pronouns are
standardly used to disambiguate reference, cf. wir/sie gehen ‘we/they go’
vs. ihr geht ‘you (pl.) go’. I am not aware of addressee-based systems of
epistemic argument marking.
The cells in Table 1 that are still empty are those where the scope is
not over a speciﬁed argument but over non-arguments like possessors or
interested parties. Epistemic systems, like the Tibetan one, cover these
along with arguments. This was exempliﬁed by (6b) above. Agreement
systems are most often tied to a speciﬁc argument, and I am not aware
of speaker-based, informant-based, or addressee-based agreement systems
that would extend to non-arguments. But one would not be surprised
to discover such systems because agreement systems with di erent per-
son features are known to occasionally extend to non-arguments. A case
in point is the Indo-Aryan language Maithili, where one kind of agree-
ment morphology di erentiates three persons (i.e. not only speaker vs.
non-speaker or informant vs. non-informant), registering either an object
argument, a possessor, or an otherwise interested referent:
(11) Maithili (Bickel et al. 1999)
a. ham
1nom
to-rā
2nh-dat
kaniy-kẽ
bride-dat
dekh-au-l-i-au-nh.
see-caus-pt-1n-2nhnn-3hnn
‘I showed younh the brideh.’
b. ham
1nom
toh-ar
2mh-gen
ghar
house
par
loc
ge-l
go-p
ch-al-i-ah.
aux-pt-1n-2mhnn
‘I had been to yourmh house.’
c. u
3nhnom
bhāig
run.cvb
je-t-auk.
aux.tel-fut-2nhnn
‘He will run away (because he is afraid of younh).’
Maithili verbs agree with up to three referents. In (11a), the ﬁrst agree-
ment marker -i registers the person of the nominative (‘n’) argument ham
‘I’. This is followed by what is called non-nominative (‘nn’) agreement
markers that realize the person and honoriﬁc degree markers of the direct
(kaniykẽ ‘bride’ ‘3h’) and the indirect object (torā ‘you, non-honoriﬁc
(nh)’). (11b) shows that the same non-nominative agreement markers can
also refer to possessors (here the second person mid-honoriﬁc (‘mh’) pro-
noun tohar ‘your’), and (11c) shows agreement with a referent that is12 Balthasar Bickel
scope
proposition
interested
referent
argument
p
e
r
s
o
n
speaker
vs. other
Turkish,
Sankong
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
h
i
p
epistemic Sangkong?
agreement Chitimacha
informant
vs. other
Tibetan
epistemic Tibetan
Std. Spoken Tib.;
Kathm. Newar
agreement Megeb Dargi
addressee
vs. other Chechen
epistemic
agreement Spanish, Ger. pl.
informant
vs. ad-
dressee
vs. other
agreement Maithili German sg.
Table 2: Person, scope and relationship variables, with additional data
involved in the situation (here, the non-honoriﬁc addressee as the cause of
the event) without being an argument or adjunct in the clause.
4 Conclusions
Table 2 expands Table 1 by adding ternary person systems and ﬁlling in
the data surveyed in the preceding section.
Most remaining gaps are likely to be accidental. This concerns exten-
sions to non-arguments (‘interested referents’) and epistemic argument
marking with addressee-based person categories. There is no compelling
reason why such systems should not occur, and it is possible that a more
extensive survey might well unearth them.
A more interesting question concerns the combination of a three-way
person distinction with epistemic marking (grey-shaded in Table 2). Such
a combination is perhaps unlikely on functional grounds because it would
presuppose that a speaker must always be able to specify that at least one
person must have deﬁnite knowledge of a proposition or an argument. This
would make it di cult to communicate information that is genuinely newVerb Agreement and Epistemic Marking 13
and unfamiliar to everyone. But some societies have a strong tendency
to presuppose as much information as possible in everyday interactions
and to sell o  any information as if it was known and familiar, e.g. by
not using referential expressions, even for new referents in a story (as
has been observed in some Tibeto-Burman languages including Tibetan,
cf. Bickel 2003, Stoll & Bickel in press). From this perspective, it would
not come as an ethnographic surprise, if in some society, people would
systematically claim that, if something is new to the interlocutors, there
must at least be an unknown third person who would be familiar with the
information. Only continued ﬁeldwork in linguistics and anthropology will
make it possible to delimit the range of what is possible here.
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